Evidence of fragility: on underwhelming growth estimates

Underwhelming growth estimates come amid worrying data on agriculture


Five months after Chief Economic Adviser Arvind Subramanian predicted that economic growth was likely to be closer to 6.5% in the current fiscal year, the Central Statistics Office has forecast that the gross domestic product (GDP) would expand at precisely that pace in the 12 months ending in March. 

The headwinds that had been flagged by Mr. Subramanian at that time are proving to be the crucial factors dampening momentum. For one, gross value added, or GVA — which excludes taxes that feature in the GDP number — is projected to grow by 6.1%, slowing from a provisional 6.6% in 2016-17, as manufacturing and the agriculture, forestry and fishing components of GVA decelerate. 

Second, the key investment metric of gross fixed capital formation, though estimated to show faster growth, is expected to shrink in terms of proportion to GDP: to 29%, from 29.5% in the provisional estimates for 2016-17 and 30.9% in 2015-16. With the Index of Industrial Production (IIP) data released in mid-December also reflecting a sharp slowdown over the seven-month period from April to October, there are signs that the rebound seen in the second quarter may be far more vulnerable to unravelling than previously considered. With agriculture struggling for traction, despite a ‘normal’ monsoon, the prospect of private final consumption expenditure regaining vigour in a hurry seems remote, especially since rural households make a sizeable contribution to aggregate demand. The forecast for consumption spending posit both a slowdown in growth to 6.3% in 2017-18, from 8.7% a year earlier, and a marginal contraction in share of GDP.

That softer growth estimates have come at a time when the government’s fiscal deficit has already crossed the budget estimate for the full year, and GST collections are underwhelming, is a particular cause for concern. With Brent crude hovering around $67 a barrel, oil prices are now well above the $60-65 range that the Economic Survey had flagged as having the potential to undermine both consumption and public and private investment. Data on kharif foodgrain production used by the CSO in computing GVA in agriculture, while provisional, project an almost 3% drop in output in 2017-18. This raises the possibility of stronger inflationary pressures on food prices in the coming months. With consumer price inflation having accelerated in November to 4.88%, the fastest pace in 15 months, monetary authorities at the Reserve Bank of India will have little to no leeway to mull interest rate reductions to support growth. On their part, policymakers must bank on building on the measures taken to unclog the credit pipelines, including the recent steps to recapitalise state-owned lenders. Other initiatives must include moves to re-energise the export sector: there may be no better time to make the most of the ‘fair winds’ of a strong global economic rebound that are blowing.

07th January - the hindu, sunday, pdf & video

Click the link to download the edited pdf of  "The Hindu"  Sunday , joining dots education.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EATq2XSKiNh3wnaNZ6l5FSpLsW2DDaf5/view?usp=sharing

Video - https://youtu.be/W0UN44YsncA

India-China boundary talks

On the line: on India-China boundary talks

It is vital that India-China talks on the boundary question pick up speed


The meeting between the Special Representatives of India and China — National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and State Councillor Yang Jiechi — on the boundary question on December 22, the 20th so far, was unique for a number of reasons.

• The talks came more than 20 months after the last round, reflecting a period of extreme strain in India-China ties,
•  including the 70-day troop stand-off at Doklam this year. 
• Previous meetings had followed each other within a year.
•  Also, at the recent Communist Party Congress, Mr. Yang was elevated to the Political Bureau, and this is the first time the Chinese side has been represented by an SR of such seniority. 
• As a result, the two sides were best poised to move ahead in the three-step process that was part of the Agreement on ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’ in 2005 — that is, defining the guidelines for the settlement of border disputes, formulating a framework agreement on the implementation of the guidelines, and completing border demarcation. 
• The SRs were given an extended mandate after meetings between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping this year, and thus went well beyond the remit of discussing the resolution of boundary issues. 
• Above all, they were guided by the Modi-Xi agreements of 2017, including the ‘Astana consensus’ that “differences must not be allowed to become disputes”, and the understanding at Xiamen that India-China relations “are a factor of stability” in an increasingly unstable world.

It would be a mistake, however, to infer that with all these engagements the worst in bilateral ties is now behind the two countries.

 Since 2013, when the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed, there has been a steady decline in relations in all spheres. 

The border has seen more transgressions, people-to-people ties have suffered amid mutual suspicion, 

and China’s forays in South Asia as well as India’s forays into South-East Asian sea lanes have increasingly become areas of contestant.

 In India, this is seen as the outcome of China’s ambition of geopolitical domination. 

In this vitiated atmosphere India views every move by China as a targeted assault — such as the 

•  the free trade agreement with the Maldives,
•  and the blocking of India’s membership bid at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 

In turn, Beijing sees:-

•  the U.S.-India defense agreements,
• the Quadrilateral engagement with Japan, Australia and the U.S., 
• and Indian opposition to the BRI quite the same way. 
• The stand-off at Doklam was a hint of what may ensue at greater regularity unless greater attention is paid to resolving the differences for which the SR meetings process was set up in the first place.

Indian district magistrate cried while reciting his success speech, true motivation

IAS cried while reciting his success speech, true motivation for life. Must watch video .

To ban the advertisement of Condom on Indian television .

Flawed, in the name of indecencyThe government’s advisory on telecast of condom advertisements is questionable on many counts

On December 11, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting issued an advisory to television channels banning all “advertisements of condoms which… could be indecent/inappropriate for viewing by children” between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.

The advisory was issued because it came to the notice of the Ministry that “some channels” were carrying “advertisements of condoms repeatedly which are alleged to be indecent especially for children.” 

It was later reportedly clarified that the advisory only applied to “sexually explicit” advertisements meant to “titillate” the audience. 

One must applaud the government’s decision to grant a safe harbour to advertisements which it considers “indecent”, instead of banning them altogether. 

After all, the Ministry could have paternalistically directed all channels not to disseminate any indecent condom advertisements whatsoever, no matter the time of the day or night at which they were shown. By allowing “indecent” condom advertisements to be disseminated between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., the government has empowered parents to decide what their children can and cannot watch, while ensuring that adults are not deprived of content which they are entitled to view. The idea behind this type of regulation is that when it is late in the evening, parents are likely to be at home when they can better supervise their children. The ban imposed by the Ministry is also tolerable because it has been inflicted on advertisements, or “commercial speech” which, in constitutional law, is often considered to be a form of “low value” speech. Further, the government has not banned all condom advertisements, but only those which are indecent.

Why it is flawed

However, the manner in which the advisory has been drafted is far too broad. The Ministry has advised channels to ban all condom advertisements which “could be indecent/inappropriate for viewing by children”. But how does one decide whether something “could” possibly be “indecent, inappropriate”, “sexually explicit” or “titillating”? In a famous case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Potter Stewart once said that while it is difficult to define the meaning of hardcore pornography, “I know it when I see it.” The distinction between art and obscenity is often paper thin and incredibly subjective. As Justice J.M. Harlan wrote in another case, “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” When different people see the same condom advertisement, many may disagree over whether it is “indecent”. Some may find it funny or informative, while others may consider it obscene or distasteful. The word “inappropriate” used in the Ministry’s advisory is even more vague than the word “indecent”.

The Ministry has also made the fatal mistake of bracketing all “children” into the same conceptual category. What is suitable for viewing by a 17-year-old boy may not be appropriate for a three-year-old girl, and both may be considered “children”. It may have been a better idea for the government to have prohibited “indecent” condom advertisements during programmes that are likely to be viewed by young children such as cricket matches or cartoons. The advisory seeks refuge in a provision in the Cable Television Network Rules, 1994, which bars any advertisement that “endangers the safety of children or creates in them any interest in unhealthy practices”. But can it really be considered an “unhealthy practice” for a sexually active 17-year-old to have safe sex? Whether we like it or not, some teenagers below the age of adulthood may engage in sexual relations. Further, it is human nature which is responsible for our sexual impulse, not condom advertisements.

Narrow focus

One also wonders what place an advisory of this kind has in today’s digital India. Television programmes shown even in the early hours of the morning can now be recorded on a digital video recorder and watched at three in the afternoon. Pornography is freely available on the Internet. Do we really need to shield the teenager, who knows how to illegally download the popular HBO series, “Game of Thrones” (which has nudity and extreme violence), from comparatively tame condom advertisements? Newspapers which carry graphic columns by “sex experts”, columns which offer advice to couples with sexual problems, are available for all and sundry to read. One also wonders where the government’s priorities lie. The government believes that condom advertisements are “unhealthy” for children, but not advertisements which encourage them to consume fizzy drinks laden with high-fructose corn syrup, or junk food, low in nutritional value, all of which may have an adverse effect on the public health system. The government also has no qualms about advertisements which sexually objectify men instead of women.

Given how difficult it is to interpret words such as “indecent” and “titillating”, and in order to make their content suitable for viewing by children of all ages, an Indian television channel may now justifiably think twice before airing any condom advertisement, whether “inappropriate” or otherwise, between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m., as it is always better to err on the side of caution. This “chilling effect” on condom advertisements will be detrimental to the public interest. It will mean that sexually active Indians may not be exposed to condom advertisements during prime time viewing hours, when such advertisements could have been seen by the highest number of people. Though offended by indecency and innuendo, the government must not forget that condoms can help prevent unplanned pregnancies and restrict the spread of sexually transmitted (sometimes life-threatening) diseases.

Abhinav Chandrachud, an advocate at the Bombay High Court, is the author of ‘Republic of Rhetoric: Free Speech and the Constitution of India’

India's First AC EMU in function

Introduction of India’s First Ever Broad Gauge Air-conditioned AC EMU (Suburban Train) of 12-car rake fitted with Indigenous 3-phase Propulsion system On Mumbai Suburban Section of W. Railway on 25th December 2017

Railways’ New Year Bonanza For The Nation Especially for Mumbaikars.

Introductory run is scheduled from Borivali station in Mumbai.

2 Coaches earmarked as Ladies Coaches, Certain seats are earmarked for Senior Citizens and Divyangs

RPF to be deployed in each coach to ensure safety.

Discount in the fare to be given during the introductory period of initial 06 months.

India-Pakistan relations

Time for an icebreaker: on India-Pakistan relations

The intellectual partition of India and Pakistan does no benefit to either country

In the late 1960s, shortly after the India-Pakistan war, the official in the Ministry of External Affairs handling the Pakistan desk received a strange request during his meeting with the new Pakistan High Commissioner. “I hope that you would deal with Pakistan as a foreign country,” the High Commissioner told the slightly puzzled Indian official, explaining that the familiarity of Indian officials with both language and culture of Pakistan ran counter to Pakistan’s desire to build their identity as a newly sovereign nation.

Two years apart 

While the two countries had been physically partitioned, and borders and check-posts now controlled people from crossing over, the ‘intellectual partition’ of India and Pakistan had not taken place at the time. Decades later, it would be hard for a Pakistani envoy to make such a complaint. India and Pakistan are not just foreign countries for each other, they are practically alien, with little to engage on in various spheres. The “intellectual and emotional partition” of the two countries is even more stark today, exactly two years since Prime Minister Narendra Modi landed in Lahore to attend his then counterpart, Nawaz Sharif’s grand-daughter’s wedding.

To begin with, Indian and Pakistani societies have learnt to look away from each other culturally. 

The process of this partition, which began in the 1950s, 

• when poets and historians began to construct separate histories, is now complete,
•  as Pakistani students learn a language more Arabic than Urdu,
• polity that begins in 1947,
• about an ancient history that relates to foreign invaders from the country’s west more than the shared history with its east.

 On the Indian side,

•  contemporary cultural linkages have been severed, with Abida Parveen and Ghulam Ali no longer able to perform in India, 
• Pakistani actors barred from work in Indian films, 
•  a television network stopping the very popular telecast of Pakistani soap operas. 
• Sporting events are fewer, and there is little “healthy rivalry” when Indian and Pakistani teams do meet: instead a defeat becomes a national disgrace, while a victory is celebrated as a quasi-military conquest. 
• Visas are still granted for pilgrimages on both sides, but for all other travel they are tightly controlled and granted as exceptions to the rule. 
• Seldom have two countries which share language, idiom, music and religion been this closed to each other, including in times of war.

Bilateral trade, which had developed a low but steady normal, could be reduced even further now: as Indian development of Chabahar port in Iran circumvents Pakistan by sea, and an air cargo corridor to Afghanistan replaces land cargo entirely. Effectively, India is willing to double its trade costs and spend billions of dollars extra in order block out Pakistan, and Pakistan is willing to risk its trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, but won’t allow Indian trade to Afghanistan come through Wagah.

The only increased ‘trade’ is that of ‘trading fire’ at the Line of Control (LoC), where Pakistan attempts to push in infiltrators over the LoC into India under covering fire, and Indian troops fire back, taking also a high toll for civilians on both sides. After the 2003 ceasefire had been implemented, villagers on either side of the LoC had returned to their homes and rebuilt schools along the area. Most of that peace has been undone by the past few years of ceasefire violations, according to a study by the United States Institute of Peace called “A Line on Fire”. From 12 ceasefire violations (CFVs) on both sides combined and one civilian casualty in 2006, 2016 saw 51 dead in about 900 CFVs. The data for this year has surpassed those numbers, which includes four Indian Army soldiers killed this weekend. Yet, neither side gives credence to claims of the other. Even after the surgical strikes of September 2016, Pakistan’s government refused to accept India’s detailed account of the cross-LoC action.

The discourse on terrorism is even more divided. After the Mumbai attacks of 2008, Pakistan admitted in public statements at least that the perpetrators of the attacks would be brought to justice. Yet in the past three years, the Mumbai trial in Rawalpindi has all but ground to a halt. The Lashkar-e-Taiba’s operations commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi is out on bail, while 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Saeed, out of custody last month, plans to stand for elections in 2018. On the Pakistani side, there’s growing belief that India funds groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as well as insurgent groups in Balochistan. Mr. Modi’s public support for the Baloch insurgency during his Independence Day speech last year did not help. The fate of Kulbushan Jadhav, whose release from Pakistani custody in other times may have been decided by mutual negotiation and a possible exchange of personnel, is now in the hands of the International Court of Justice.


Difficult calendar

While both India and Pakistan have recently appointed new High Commissioners to Islamabad and Delhi, respectively, there is very little hope of any fresh initiative at this point. Pakistan heads into its electoral process in a few months, once the Senate elections are done in March and a caretaker government is put in place. By the time a new Prime Minister is in place there, the Indian general election campaign will begin to roll out. Given Mr. Modi’s recent attack on former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for meeting the new Pakistani envoy at a dinner during the Gujarat campaign, and suggesting collusion between the two, it is unlikely that the political atmosphere would allow for even diplomatic niceties to be maintained.

Yet, for a number of reasons, it is even more necessary for both sides to stem this intellectual partition today. India has long opposed “third-party interventions”, but the lack of dialogue with Pakistan is imposing just that, with every dispute between the two countries now being taken up at global forums: the United Nations, Financial Action Task Force, International Court of Justice, and World Bank for the Indus Waters Treaty.

Second, with the U.S. drawing India into its Afghanistan policy, and China’s stakes in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the subcontinent is becoming an area of contestation by players bigger than both India and Pakistan. Even in Afghanistan, their interests are being increasingly defined by the coalitional arcs being drawn: with the U.S., India, and Afghanistan ranged on one side; and Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and the Taliban on the other.


The alphabet soup: 

India’s decision to stay out of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meet in Pakistan has also complicated its standing as a regional leader. 

While alternative arrangements such as The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) initiative and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) represent some parts of the region, they cannot replace the whole, and the region becomes easier to fragment, as China has managed to do by making inroads into Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

Finally, re-engagement will inevitably follow disengagement at some point, and the growing distance between the people of both countries will be much more difficult for their governments to bridge in the future. Even without bilateral talks, the two sides can explore simple engagements on the environment, medical tourism, energy pipelines and electric grids in the interim. In a world where connectivity is the new currency, and multiple alignments are replacing polar geopolitics, it is hard to justify the disconnected space that New Delhi and Islamabad are hurtling into.